accomplish this task~ the machine will have to fulfil[ at [east the following baste requirement.
It has to be ab|e to build a file that consists of records of-all the individuals~ that is~ events~ objects~ etc. ~ mentioned in the text~ and~ for e~eh individual~ record whatever is said about it. OF couPse~ fop the time being at [east~ it seems that such a text interpreter is not a praetica[ idea~ but this should not discourage us from studying.in abstPaet what kind of capabilities the machine would have to possess~ provided that our study provides us with some insight into natural langL~ge in general.
In this paper I intend to discuss one particular feature a text interpreter must have: that it must be able to recognize when a novel individual is mentioned in the input text and to store it atong with its characterization fop future reference. Of course~ in some P_~ses the problem is trivial. Suppose there appears in some sentence a proper name that has not been mentioned previously. This means that a new pePson is being intPoduced in the text and appPopPiate action must be taken to PecoPd the name of the pePson and what is said about him.
OthePwise, the pPopeP name is used to PefeP to an individual already mentioned and the machine has to locate his file in the memory with the help of the name. This pPoblem of identification wilt be mope difficult where a definite descPiption--a definite noun phPase such as the man Bill saw 7estePda~,--is used, since thePe will, in genePal, not be any simple look-up procedure fop associating the descPiption with the Pight individual. With definite noun phrases there is also the pPoblem that it is not possible to tell just from the noun phPase itself whetheP oP not it is supposed to refer" to an individual at all. Fop example, it is cleaP that the phPase the best student is not used PefePentiaUy in a sentence such as Bill is the best student. -[-here ape thus two problems with ordinary definite noun phrases: (i) Is it a definite descPiption at all? and (ii) How to match a definite descPiption with an individual already mentioned in the text? The fiPst question is clearly of the kind linguists can be expected to solve, but it will not be discussed here. The only aspect of definite descPiptions that interests us hepe is the fact that they caPPy an existential presupposition: to call something "the ... " presupposes that there be some such thing.
While it is in genePal a stPaight-for~vaPd matter-to decide whether or not a.proper name in a text introduces a new individual, indefinite noun phrases pose a more difficult probtem. To put the question in a general way: Given an indefinite noun phrase, under what circumstances is there supposed to be an individual described by this noun phrase? This need not be understood as some sort off ontological question subject to philosophical speculation, in this paper" [ intend to approach it from a purety linguistic point of view.
It is in just those cases where the appearance of an indefinite NP implies the existence of some specific entity that our hypothetical text interpreter shoutd record the appearance of a new individual.
What [ have in mind can perhaps be made clear w ~:h the hetp of the following examples, it is a watt-known fact about language that indefinite noun phrases cannot be interpreted as refer'ring to expressions when they appear, in the predicate nominal position.
(l) Bitl is not a linguist.
(l) is obviousty a statement about one individual. It is not a statement about some linguist and [Bill. It is also weir-known that in generic sentences singutar indefinite noun phrases play a peculiar rote.
(2) A tion is a mighty hunter`.
In its gener'ic sense, (2) is a statement about tions in general, not about any tion in particular,, unless we want to postulate a hypothetical entity 'the typical lion' of whom all generic statements about lions ape predicated. It is clear that indefinite noun phrases have a very special Pole in (l) and (2) and it is not difficult to decide that they could not introduce any new individuals into a discourse. It is out of question that a text in which (1) appears would contain a later" reference to 'the linguist which Bitt is not' or that (2) (3) and (4).
(5) Bill saw a unicorn. The unicorn had a gold mane.
(6) Bill didn't see a unicorn. *The unicorn had a gold mane.
Let us say that the appearance of an indefinite noun phrase establishes a discourse referent just in case it justifies the occurrence of: a corererential pronoun or a definite noun phrase hater in the text. In this paper we will try to find out under what circumstances discourse referents are established. We maintain that the problem of corefer-ence within a discourse is a linguistic problem and can be studied independently of any general theory of extra-linguistic reference.
The present study was inspired by the notion of 'referential indices' in transformational grammar. Following a suggestion by Noam Chomsky (1965) , it has generally been assumed that the base component of a transformational grammar associates with each noun phrase a referential index, say, some integer. The purpose of Chomsky's proposal was not so much to account for the meaning of sentences, but to augment the notion of noun phrase identity. It seemed that the notion of 'referential identity' was needed in addition to the two other types of identity, 'structural identity' and 'morphemic identity', for the structural descriptions of certain transformations.
According to the standard theory, referential indices are merely formal indicators of coreference with no further semantic significance.
They amP not meant to imply the existence of discourse referents in our sense. This notion of cor~fempntiality has played an important role in recent syntactic arguments. It led to the study of pronoun-antecedent relations, largely ignored by traditional grammarians, which has revealed intricate constraints that have great theoretical impor~tance.
What we are studying in this paper can be looked at as further constraints on compFerentiality that extend beyond the sentence level,
]. Case studies l. 1 A note on specificity [n the following we amP going to examine case by case certain aspects of sentence structure that play a role in cletermining whether an indefinite NP establishes a discourse referent.
In the examples that ape discussed~ there is a possible ambiguity that has to be mentioned in advance, although it will not be discussed until later. In general, indefinite noun phrases have both a specific and norr-specific interpretation. Example (7) can be interpreted to mean either (8a) or (Bb).
Bill didn't see a misprint.
(a) 'There is a misprint which Bill didn't see'
[1 = (7) iS Understood in the sense of (8a), we say that the indefinite NP a misprint is interpreted specifically. (Sb) represents the non-specific interpretation. OF course, not all indefinite noun phrases are ambiguous in this way. We could disambiguate (7) by adding the word certain ("a certain misprint") or an appositive relative clause ("a misprint, which I had made on purpose"). These changes would allow only the specific interpretation (8a). The addition of the word ~ ("a single misprint") would allow only the sense (Sb). There are also cases where the verbs involved partially disambiguate the sentence by making one interpretation Far more plausible to the reader than the other. For example, the NP a piano in (9a) is naturally understood non-specifically, that is, as meaning 'any piano', white the same noun phrase in (9b) suggests the l interpretation 'a certain pianO'.
(9) (a) John tried to find a piano.
(b) John tried to lift a piano.
(but he didn't succeed in finding one]
[but he didn't succeed in lifting it]
It is something about the verb lift that suggests that a piano describes some specific object. On the other hand, (9a) is easily understood to inform us only about the kind of object John was trying to find. We note in passing that, if interpreted in the above manner, (9b) establishes a discourse referent, i.e., 'the piano John tried to lift', but (9a) certainly does not justify a later reference to 'the piano John tried to Find'. Example (7) establishes a referent in its specific sense 'the misprint which Bitt didn't see', but fails to do so in the sense, of (Sb).
I_et us forget, for the time being, that indefinite noun phrases can also be understood specifically and consider first only non-specific interpretations.
Complement clauses
As pointed out above, an indefinite noun phrase does generally establish a discourse referent when it appears in a simple affirmative sentence. But if the sentence is negated, a non-specific NP felts to establish a referent. Let us, tentatively, accept this finding for simple sentences and took at cases where an indefinite NP belongs to a complement clause. There are many other factors that play a rote here besides negation.
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Modal verbs
The following examples are anomalous in the intended sen&e, although there is no negation involved.
(10) (a) You must write a letter to your parents. *They are expecting the letter.
(b) Bill can make a kite. *The kite has a tong string.
Tr`aditionalty~ sentences with a modal auxiliary have been considered as simple sentences. However~ it has been argued convincingly by Ross (1967a) and others that modals should be analyzed as main ver"bs o£ higher` sentences. Therefore~ let us assume that~ even in the above examples~ the indefinite NPs originate in a complement clause~ just as they do in (l l).
(l]) (a) John wants to c~toh a fish. *Do you see the fish from here?
(b) Mary expects to have a baby. *The baby's name is Sue.
There is a great number` of verbs that behave like want and e_.~pect in this respect~ e.g. ~ try~ ptan~ ~ hope~ etc. What is common to all of them is that the complement sentence by itself is understood to represent a yet untrue proposition at the time specified by the tense and time adverbials in the main clause. The present pr`oblem~ is in fact~ another point in favor` of the view that modals originate in a higher" sentence~ because it enables us to acknowledge the similarity of the anomaly in (10) and (]1). The conct'usion is that non-specific indefinites do not establish discourse referents when they appear` in a complement of a modal verb.
l. 22 I mplicatives
There is a class of verbs that~ if they are not negated~ imply the truth of the proposition represented by their" complement sentence. There ape also verbs that inhePently have a negative implication. In English, this type includes ver'bs such as foP~t, fail, and neglect.
Let us call them implicative verbs. 2 In English~ this group includes
Consider" the following anomalous discour"ses.
(14) (a) John for-got to wr"ite atePm paper". *He cannot show it to the teacher".
(b) John failed to find an answer". *It was wr"ong.
These implicative ver"bs have the ver"y interesting pr"oper"ty that, if i there is double negation, the implication is positive, and an indefinite NP does, after" all~ establish a referent.
(14) (a) John didn't fail to find an answer. The answer was even right.
(b) John didn't remember" not to bring an umbrella, although we had no room for" it.
This pr`operty distinguishes clearly verbs with negative implication, such as for`ge.___, tt, fr`orn modal verbs discussed above, although both types deny the tr`uth of the proposition represented by the complement sentence.
Factive verbs
There is a group o£ verbs, called facttve verbs (Kiparsky 1968 ), that presuppose the truth of the proposition represented by the cornplement. For" example, know, realty_e, and regret are factive. It is not surpr-istng to find out that an indefinite NP does establish a refer'ent in a complement of a factive verb, of course, provided that the complement itself is affirmative.
(15) John knew that aar`y had a car', but he had never" seen it.
In contr"ast to the implicative ver"bs discussed above, negation in the main sentence has no effect at art.
(]6) Bitl didn't realize that he had a dime. It was in his pocket
The truth of the embedded preposition is presupposed even if the facrive ver"b itself is negated. Oonsequently, (16) For exampie~ in (18), the speaker--unlike Bill---must hold that the complement is true. The non-f-active verb is binding for the speaker only in case he is talking in the first person as in (]7). BUt even in case that the speaker withholds judgment or disagrees altogether~ an indefinite NP in the complement of a non-factive verb that implies positive belief does establish a referent of a peculiar sort. It can be I referred to again in a complement of a similar non-factive verb that has the same subject.
(19) Bill says he saw a lion on the street. He claims the lion had escaped from the Zoo.
What this amounts to is that a text interpreting device will have to sort out what belongs to 'the world as seen by the speaker' and" 'the world as seen by X'. The same referents need not exist in all of these worlds.
A nor~factive vePb that implies positive belief (clairr~, think, believe, say, etc.) allows an indefinite NP in the complement to establish a referent as far as the world of the subject person is corr- in (20), what appear-s to be an omdtnar-y non-specific object NP fails to estabtish a ~,'efer-ent, atthough the ~ntence is affirmative asser-tion. There are many other-verbs in addition to those tn (20) that have this peculiar" consequence, for` exampte: ask for`, destr'e~ expect, hope for`, propose, ~quest, sugge~, watt for`, yearn for-. It seems significant that most if not all of these ver-bs, in addition to or`dinar`y noun phrase objects, atso take In fact, these are the same modal v~s discussed above ( §1.21) that imply that the proposition represented by the complement is not yet true. We can thus account for tile l~culiarity of (20a-d) by assuming that, in spite of the simplicity-of the su~ce structure, the ordinary noun phrase objects of these verbs are derived from underlying r~~ons .which contain sentential objects. This is clearly one of those cases where semantic problems can be simplified by assuming a more abstract deep structure. But it is not entirely clear what kind of embedded sentence should underly the surface object. There seems to be little evidence for deciding this question beyond the observation that it cer~cainly .~uld be some type of existential or possessive construction. This is because of many noar paraphrases of the following type. In some cases an existential paraphrase seems more natural, in
• other" cases one prefers a possessive interpretation. Qbserve the difference between (23a) and (24a) Notice also that the life-span of a short term referent is not always so neatly bound as the above examples suggest.
Sequences 0f the following type are quite common.
(26) You must write a letter to your" parents. It has to be sent by air'matt. The letter must get there by tomorrow.
At least incase of modals (and the future will), it is possible to " continue discussing a thing that actually does not yet exist, provided that the discourse continues in the same mode. In this case, every successive sentence is prefixed by the same type of modal. Even the following example is possible.
(27) Mary wants to marry a rich man. He must be a banker.
Under the non-specific interpretation of a rich man~ there is no specific individual yet that Mary wants to marry--and there may :never be one. By continuing with another modal, however, it is possible to elaborate on the attributes of this yet non-existing -20individual. 3 In the following sections we will present other oases where the tile-span of a short term referent may be extended.
I. 4 Suppositions
Another way to talk about what is not is to suppose that it is. Consider the following discourses. (b) If tv~ary has a oar~ she will take me to work in it.
I can drive the cam too.
(c) If Mary had a cam~ she would take me to work in it.
I could drive the car too. (29) I wish Mary had a car. *I will drive it.
That is~ f/ctitious individuals may be referred to ~naphoPically only as long as the proper fictitious mode is sustained, but when the illusion is broken, they cease to exist.
As the above examples show~ a text interpreter must also be able to cope with short tePr~ referents that owe their existence to some condition that in reality is not fulfilled. It must catch a supposition in whcx~tever foPn3 it comes and recognize where the supposition ceases to be in force. Neither of the two tasks is likely to be easy. FoP example, what looks like oomman d may~ nevertheless, be a supposition.
(30) Lend him a book and heql never return it.
Commands and Yes-No Questions
It is to be expected that indefinite noun phrases in commands in (35), only the specific interpretation is possible. There must be a unique girl and a unique go-go dancer. This fact indicates that a non-specific indefinite fails to establish a discourse referent in case there is a quantifier'-like term in the sentence, in spite of the fact that the sentence is an affirmative assertion.
But notice that the following example is ambiguous again.
(36) Harvey cOurts a girl at every convention. She always comes to the banquet with him. The girl is usually also very pretty.
(36) admits both the specific and non-specific interpretation of a girl.
The reason for" the anomaly of the non-specific interpretation in (35) and its acceptability here is apparently that, in (36), every successive sentence continues to have a similar quantifier--like term: "at every convention", "always", "usually". There is also nothing wrOng with ~he non-specific interpretation of the NP a book in (37).
(37) Every time Bill comes here, he picks up a book and wants to borrow it. I never let him take the book.
We have to say that, although a non-specific indefinite that falls into the scope of a quantifier fails to establish a permanent discourse referent, theme may be a short term referent ,within the scope of the quantifier and its life-span may be extended by flagging every successive sentence with a quantifier" of the same type. 4 -Z5 -
2.

Specificity
Let us now return to the problem of specificity that was First introduced in § 1.1. As we already pointed out, many of the examples above that were judged anomalous in the intended sense can also be given another interpretation that makes them perfectly acceptable. Base structures resemble formulas in symbolic logic. This approach to syntax has now become known as 'generative semantics'.
It is easy to see that in the framework of generative semantics e there is no justification nor need for a feature such as [+specific] .
The ambiguities in question ape naturally accounted fop by the fact that the quantifier binding variable that underlies some indefinite noun phrase may be placed in different positions in the base structure.
Specificity thus becomes a ITiEtter of the scope of quantifie rs.
As far as the problems discussed in this paper ape relevant to choosing a theoPetical framework~ they seem to argue in favor of adopting the Bach-McOawle~ proposals, It is rather difficult to see, how one could achieve an adequate description of the facts in the classical theory, FoP example~ consider the following case. Both (39a) and (39b) are ambiguous with respect to specificity.
(39) (a) Bill intends to visit a museum.
(b) Bill visits a museum every day.
In the tspecifict sense~ both examples establish a discouPse referent. q It would make perfect sense to continue with a descP~:~tion of lthe museum Bill intends to visit t or fthe museum Bill visits every day'.
-
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In the 'non-specific' sense, there is no such museum at all. So far so good, we can say that the NP a museum can be r+specific]. But what about example (40)?
(40) Bill intends to visit a museum every day.
It is clear that (40) is ambiguous in many ways. For example, the quantified time adverb every day could be assigned either to the complement or to the main clause, let us now consider only the Former case. The remaining ambiguities should be attributable to the indefinite NP a museum, in Fact, we should have a two--way ambiguity between the specific and nort-specific interpretation. But example (40) is stilt ambiguous in more than two ways. It could be interpreted to mean (41a)~ (41b), or (41c).
(41) (a) 'There is a certain museum that Bill intends to visit every day. ' (b) 'Bill intends that there be some museum that he visits every day. '
(c) 'Bill intends to do a museum visit every day. '
It is easy to see why this happens. What the feature F±specific] accomplishes in case of (39a) is that it clarifies the relation between the indefinite NP a museum and the verb intend in the main sentence:
Is Bill's intention about some particular museum or not? In (39b), we employed the same device to characterize the relation between Another advantage of generative semantics is that there is an explanation ready for the fact that (40) establishes a discourse referent under only one of the three interpretations we have considered, narnely (42a).
I
The rule is that an indefinite NP establishes a permanent referent just in case the proposition to which the binding quantifier is attached is -29assumed (asserted, implied, or presupposed) to be true, provided that the quantifier is not itself in the scope of some higher quantifier. 7
The First part of the rule accounts For the difference between (42a) and (42b-c), the second part is needed to explain why (39b) establishes a permanent referent only under one of the two possible interpretations. Notice that, in (42a), the quantifier underlying the NP a museum is attached to the main proposition. Since the main proposition is asserted to be true and there are no higher quantifiers involved, (2~2a) establishes a referent corresponding to the NP a museum. Now, consider the other two interpretations of (40). The verb intend is one of the modal verbs discussed in (1.21). We know that the complement of a modal verb taken by itself is not implied or presupposed to be true. In (42b) and (42c), the quantifier underlying the NP a museum is attached to the complement. Therefore~ the above rule correctly predicts that no referent corresponding to a m museum is established under these two interpretations.
From the point of view of a text interpreting device, the classical theory has tittle to recommend itself. The problems studied above clearly argue in Favor of the Bach-McOawtey framework, in processing a sentence, a text interpreter apparently has to associate an indefinite NP with a variable and attach the binding quantifier to some sentence above the NP using whatever clues there are present to assign the scope with as little ambiguity as possible. Clues that reduce scope ambiguity include the presence of an appositive relative clause or of special words such as "certain"~ "single"~ and "some"
in the noun phrase itself and the surface order of quantifiers~ negation, and articles in the rest of the sentence. Secondly~ the interpreter has to keep track of the truth value of the proposition represented by the sentence to which the quantifier is attached. The following example demonstrates some of the diFFiculties that are involved. Let us start a discourse with (43).
(43) Mary may want to mammy a Swede.
Highly schematicalty~ the underlying structure of (48) is something like (44). if the speaker continues the discourse with (46), the preceding sentence (48) can only be understood in the sense of (4.5a).
(46) She introduced him to her mother yesterday.
However, the following continuation, .where the pronoun its' stands for" $2, permits both (4,5a) and (45b).
(47) Suppose that it is tr`ue, then she will certainly introduce him to her mother.
As a final example, after some thought it should be obvious that a disoourse consisting of (48) and (48) (48) Suppose that it is true and that she does it, then she will certainly introduce him to her mother.
Although the argument against the traditional fea±ure [-+specific]
should leave no doubt about its uselessness in discussing anything but the simplest kind of scope ambiguity, it does not necessarily mean that the familiar terms 'specific' and 'non-specific' should be rejected.
They have proved quite useful and no harm is done, provided that they are understood in a relative sense and not as denoting some absolute property inherent in indefinite noun phrases. For example, consider interpretation (45b) of (4.3), which assigns the quantifier to S 2 • One might ,want to say that, with respect to the verb want the indefinite NP a Swede is specific.
On the other hand, if the quantifier is attached to $3, as in (45c), a Swede could be called non-specific with respect to want. In general', let us call an indefinite NP specific with respect to a given verb (or quantifier, or negation) if the latter is in the scope of the quantifier associated with the NP. It is non-specific in case the verb commands the quantifier. This kind of definition seems consistent with the way these terms have been used in recent literature, and there is no reason to stop using them as tong as the relative nature of specificity is understood.
Summary
It is time to review the situation. We started by asking the seemingly na|be question: "When is there supposed to be an individual associated with an indefinite noun phrase?" Na|k/e as it may be, it must be answered in case there is ever going to be a device for inter-preting written texts or everyday conversation with anything approaching human sophistication. There is also another reason to be interested in the subject. From a linguistic point of view, it is a problem of coreference constraints of a somewhat different kind than those studied under the label 'Pronominalization'. The present type of constraints are even more basic. It would seem that the question whether two noun phrases can be coreferential at all must precede the question whether a pronoun-antecedent relation may hold between them.
Secondly, if relative clauses are derived transformationally from conjoined sentences by 'Retativization', as many linguists believe, the constraints discussed here are also a prerequisite For that transformation. For these reasons~ the problems studied in this paper are of some theoretical interest quite independently from whether the results lead to any practical applications.
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We found that, in simple sentences that do not contain certain quantifier-like expressions, an indefinite NP establishes a discourse referent just in case the sentence is an affirmative assertion. By 'establishes a discourse referent' we meant that there may be a coreferentiat pronoun or definite noun phrase tater in the discourse, indefinite NPs in Yes-No questions and commands do not establish refe rents.
In studying more complicated examples, it was found neces-saP)/to replace Chomsky's integer-type referential indices by bound variables.
In this frarnework~ the traditional problem of specificity is treated as scope ambiguity. We studied several types of verbs that take complements and their semantic properties. We concluded that~ in general~ an indefinite NP establishes a permanent discourse referent just in case the quant[fier associated with it is attached to a sentence that is asserted, implied~ or presupposed to be true and there ape no higher quantifiers involved.
There ape a couple of special problems: 'other worlds' and short term referents. Although discourse referents ordinarily exist for the speaker~ there is a class of fworid--cr@ating t verbs~ such as believe r that also establish PefePents of another kind. These exist fop somebody else~ not necessarily for the speaker. ThePefoPe~ we need to distinguish between the speakerts world and other realms
